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Abstract 
In 2001, the South Korean government passed the Anti-Corruption Act, which provides 
whistleblower protection in the public sector. The system of protections and rewards was 
strengthened in 2011 by the Act on the Protection of Public Interest Whistleblowers. 
Although these laws ensure immunity—and even financial incentives—for whistleblowers, 
whistleblowing is still not a straightforward task. Based on a survey of 5706 public officials 
in central government, this study examines how a range of factors influence whistleblowing 
intention: attitude; knowledge; colleague support; organizational support; and protection 
against retaliation. A number of demographic variables, relating to gender; marital status; 
length of tenure; duty; and position type are used as controls. The results of the ordered probit 
regression analysis show all of the independent variables to have a significant positive effect 
on whistleblowing intention. However, colleague support and organizational 
support have the biggest effects, while perceived protection against retaliation has the 
smallest. This suggests that there is a need for future government efforts to build upon the 
available legal protections by focusing on creating a supportive culture among colleagues and 
in the organization more generally. 
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Determinants of Whistleblowing Intention: Evidence from the South 
Korean Government 
Public sector whistleblowing has received considerable attention from researchers over the 
past three decades (Bashir, Khattak, Hanif & Chonan, 2011; Buchan, 2005; Cho and Song, 
2015; Miceli & Near, 1988; Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009; Rosenbloom & Gong, 2013). In 
public administration, whistleblowers are a valuable means of exposing wrongdoing (such as 
fraud, waste, and abuse) that has already occurred or is presently taking place within public 
agencies. Whistleblowers have the advantage of possessing inside knowledge about their 
organizations and policy implementation processes as they can access information that is not 
readily available to government oversight systems or the public. Thus, the rigorous protection 
of whistleblowers serves to enhance government accountability and transparency, as well as 
public officials’ freedom of speech (Rothschild, 2008). 
Despite the benefits, the act of exposing wrongdoing within an organization is no easy 
task, and whistleblowers are often exposed to negative consequences such as demotion, 
dismissal and blacklisting (Cassematis & Wortley, 2013; Chang et al., 2013; Miceli & Near, 
1985, 1992). The importance of whistleblower protection has been recognized at a global 
level and numerous countries have enacted legislation (Park, Blenkinsopp, Oktem & 
Omurgonulsen, 2008). In particular, following OECD recommendations in 1998, the 
proportion of member states offering legal protection for whistleblowers increased from 44% 
in 2000 to 66% in 2009 (OECD, 2012a). More recently, progress has been made in the legal 
protections for whistleblowers among G20 countries including the US, Australia, China, 
France and India (Wolfe, Worth, Dreyfus & Brown, 2014). South Korea (hereafter “Korea”) 
has also introduced protections. Following the passage of the Anti-Corruption Act in 2001, 
Korea enacted the Act on the Protection of Public Interest Whistleblowers, one of the most 
comprehensive whistleblower protection laws in the world, in 2011 (Wolfe et al., 2014). 
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Nevertheless, despite improved legal support in Korea, whistleblowing still appears to be 
detrimental to public officials’ careers, with dismissal often following the decision to come 
forward (Chang et al., 2013). 
Although public officials are cognizant of the difficulties of reporting wrongdoing, 
and many shoulder the risks and potential hardships, why do some public officials intend to 
blow the whistle while others do not? What factors influence their whistleblowing decisions? 
The present study examines these two questions in the Korean context. Using large-scale 
survey data, we analyze the extent to which there is a conducive environment in Korea by 
examining public officials’ attitudes toward and knowledge of whistleblowing along with 
perceptions of organizational support and protection against retaliation, and testing their 
relationship to whistleblowing intention.  
It is important to note that we examine intent, rather than actual whistleblowing 
behavior. Intent has been viewed as a predictor of behavior generally (Ajzen, 1991), and 
whistleblowing in particular (Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009). While recognizing that the actual 
results for whistleblowing may differ from intent (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005), 
we follow a number of previous studies in using intent as a proxy for behavior (Keil, Tiwana, 
Sainsbury & Sneha, 2010; Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009), due to the reported relationship with 
behavior and the challenges of obtaining large-scale data on infrequent behavior. 
While there have been numerous attempts at explaining whistleblowing intention 
(Ahmad, Ismail & Azmi, 2013; Cho & Song, 2015 Keil et al., 2010; Mesmer-Magnus & 
Viswesvaran, 2005; Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009; Robinson, Robertson & Curtis, 2012), the 
complexity of the issue and range of potential variables means that there are difficulties when 
attempting to apply over-arching theories to whistleblowing. As such, the present study draws 
upon a range of literature in order to formulate and test hypotheses relating to attitude toward 
and knowledge of whistleblowing, along with colleague and organizational support, and 
DETERMINANTS OF WHISTLEBLOWING INTENTION 4 
 
perceived protection against retaliation.  
This study aims to contribute to the literature in three main ways. The first is to 
contribute to the international and cross-cultural research on whistleblowing by furthering 
knowledge about whistleblowing in the Korean context. Although there is a growing 
international literature on whistleblowing (Hwang, Staley, Te Chen & Lan, 2008; Keenan, 
2007; Zhang, Chiu & Wei, 2009), it is still the case that less is known about the 
whistleblowing intention of government employees outside of the West. The Korean central 
government is a suitable case for investigation due to the introduction of policies and 
sustained efforts at implementation. Indeed, there have been ongoing attempts to change 
attitudes toward whistleblowing, along with improving related knowledge and organizational 
support and protection for whistleblowers (ACRC, 2016). Yet, the Korean government 
continues to face difficulties in its fight against corruption (Transparency International, 
2016). Thus, there is a need to examine the whistleblowing intention of public sector 
employees within this context. The second aim is to contribute to theory development on 
whistleblowing through testing a number of hypotheses. Finally, this study seeks to make 
recommendations for government organizations that will help to create a more conducive 
environment for reporting wrongdoing.  
The remainder of this study is composed as follows. Whistleblowing in the Korean 
context is discussed in the next part, along with hypotheses based upon the literature about 
predictors of whistleblowing intention. After outlining the study methods, the results of the 
statistical analysis of survey data collected from 5706 central government public officials are 
presented. In the final part, conclusions are drawn and suggestions outlined for improving 
whistleblower protection. 
Theoretical Background 
Whistleblowing and the Korean Context 
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Whistleblowing has been famously defined as “disclosure by organization members (former 
or current) of illegal, immoral, and illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, 
to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action” (Near & Miceli, 1985, p. 4). 
Though originally developed in relation to the private sector, this definition has been widely 
applied in public sector research (Robinson et al., 2012; Tavakoli, Keenan & Cranjak-
Karanovic, 2003). According to this perspective, whistleblowing is a process that involves 
“the whistleblower, the whistleblowing act or complaint, the party to whom the complaint is 
made, and the organization against which the complaint is lodged” (Near & Miceli, 1985, p. 
2).  
In the Korean context, it is important to note the distinctive political environment, 
where factors relating to government, economics, labor market, and culture may have 
constrained whistleblowing. There have been successive waves of administrative and 
regulatory reforms since democratization in the late 1980s. However, the limits of 
liberalization in the face of strong state traditions have been emphasized, and there has not 
been a dramatic reduction in the influence of elected politicians over the bureaucracy since 
democratization (Park & Wilding, 2016).  
Close working relationships between politicians and the chaebol (diversified 
conglomerates) continue and have included presidential pardons of senior chaebol figures 
convicted of corruption related crimes (The Economist, 2010). Most recently, former 
president Park Geun-hye was arrested in March 2017 following impeachment for using her 
business connections to pressure companies to give millions of dollars to the non-profit 
foundations of her confidante Choi Soon-sil (BBC News, 2016). It remains to be seen 
whether this will affect attitudes to corruption in the longer term. However, the benefits that 
the chaebol bring to Korean society in terms of employment and financial investment mean 
that individuals may hesitate to challenge their interests. 
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While public sector jobs have long been coveted in Korea due the status and job-
security offered, a key development since the 1997 Asian financial crisis has been labor 
market deregulation. Approximately one third of Korean jobs now have ‘non-standard’ 
employment conditions meaning that there is no security of tenure, and less wages and 
benefits than for standard employees (Cooke & Brown, 2015). Thus, public sector jobs 
continue to be desirable, as seen through the competitive examination system. This raises 
questions about the extent to which public employees would risk their employment to report 
corruption. 
In terms of cultural context, Korea differs from the West due to its traditional 
emphasis on Confucianism and hierarchical collectivism (Wilding, Chae & Jang, 2014; Yang 
& Torneo, 2016). Confucianism stresses love, harmony, kindness, and benevolence, 
underpinned by respect for seniors (according to age and position) (Kee, 2008). In terms of 
hierarchical collectivism, Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) point to group loyalties and 
uncertainty avoidance among the Korean people as key characteristics. Both Confucianism 
and hierarchical collectivism may be important for whistleblowing as it has been argued that 
in contemporary Korea, the traditional loyalty between sovereign and subject has been 
reinterpreted as organizational loyalty (Park, Rehg & Lee, 2005), and that there has been a 
tendency to view whistleblowers as betrayers (Chang, Park & Min, 2011). 
Although it was not until 2001 that the Anti-Corruption Act was passed, a number of 
early public sector whistleblowing cases greatly contributed to controlling corruption, 
promoting budgetary efficiency, guaranteeing people’s right to know, and advancing human 
rights (Park, 2008). Still, despite benefiting Korean society, the absence of appropriate legal 
protections meant that whistleblowers were harshly treated in the form of job loss and even 
suicide resulting from social pressure and retaliation (Shin, 2006). The first instance of public 
whistleblowing since 1953 took place in 1990 when Lee Moon-ok, a public official of the 
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Board of Audit and Inspection, spoke out about the role of illegal lobbies in the halting of 
investigations into chaebol branches. His whistleblowing exposed the undesirable and illegal 
cooperation between government and the chaebol. Nevertheless, Lee was placed under arrest 
for four days after he stepped forward, on the grounds that he had disclosed confidential 
information relating to his duty, and he also lost his job. In 1996, Lee won all resulting 
lawsuits, and was found not guilty of disclosing confidential information. After his five-year 
legal battle, he came back to government employment in a different role, before retiring in 
1999 (Huh, 2010).  
A second case involved Lieutenant Lee Jee-mun of the Korean Army who exposed 
irregularities concerning absentee voting on his military base during the 14th National 
Congressional Election on March 22, 1992. According to Lieutenant Lee, soldiers were 
forced to participate in both open and proxy voting, and to attend a special lecture on the 
theme of supporting ruling party candidates. After blowing the whistle, Lieutenant Lee was 
detained and demoted to the rank of private. Following a three-year lawsuit, he was cleared 
of spreading disinformation but prevented from returning to Samsung Group, where he had 
obtained an entry level position before undertaking mandatory military service (Lee, J.M., 
2003). 
 According to J.Y. Lee (2003), there were 32 significant whistleblowing cases during 
the 1990s in diverse organizations and across a number of fields, including cases involving 
the Audit Board, the military, the police, local elections, social welfare facilities, the Bank of 
Korea, private schools, Incheon Airport, and various government contracts. The lack of 
sufficient legal protection meant that most whistleblowers lost their jobs. Interestingly, a 1999 
study into perceptions and attitude toward whistleblowing among 389 public officials 
working for Seoul City government found that over half of respondents would whistleblow if 
they uncovered corruption and the problem persisted after their efforts to fix it (Lee, 1999). 
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However, it was still the case that 47.4% responded that whistleblowing outside the 
organization was undesirable, and 51.8% thought that it boosted distrust among 
organizational members.3  
Due to the number of negative outcomes for whistleblowers, civil society 
organizations persistently requested the enactment of legal protection. Faced with 
campaigning by Citizen Solidarity for the Anti-Corruption Act, a group of 38 civil society 
organizations, the National Assembly finally passed the Anti-Corruption Act, which was 
signed into law by President Kim Dae-jung on June 28, 2001 (Park, 2004; Lee, J.Y., 2003). 
The Act incorporated whistleblowing provisions including a requirement for public officials 
to report cases of corruption, and set forth guidelines for whistleblowing and investigation 
processes, protection from retaliation, compensation and reward, and establishment of the 
Anti-Corruption Agency (Committee), which was “the first legal agency that was solely 
dedicated to anticorruption function in Korean history” (Choi, 2009, p. 200).  
Since its enactment, the law has been amended twice (2005 and 2008), and further 
legal provision was made in 2011, in the form of the Act on the Protection of Public Interest 
Whistleblowers. The 2011 law aims both to protect and financially reward public and private 
sector whistleblowers. Observed wrongdoings should be reported to the Anti-Corruption and 
Civil Rights Commission (ACRC), which fulfills the functions of both anti-corruption 
commission and ombudsman. Between 2002 and 2013, the ACRC received information on 
28,246 reported cases of wrongdoing. In the 220 cases which were deemed to be instances of 
                                                          
3 The questions asked were: “Even though you tried to fix the problem of corruption in your organization and 
the corruption practice still continues, do you blow the whistle outside of the organization?” (Responses: 
Strongly yes: 3.7%; Yes: 53.1%; No: 43.2%; Not at all: 0%). The questions relating to attitude were, firstly: 
“What do you think about public officials blowing the whistle outside of the organization?” (Responses: 
Desirable 52.6%; Not Desirable: 47.4%); secondly: “If you think about whistleblowing, what kind of image first 
comes to mind?” (Responses: Efficient tool to get rid of corruption: 13.4%; Improve ethics and democracy in 
organization: 14.4%; Increase right to know of citizens: 2.1%; Spoil line of command: 4.9%; Boost distrust 
among organizational members: 51.8%; Decrease public trust of government (public organizations) by exposing 
low quality of information: 13.4%). 
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corruption, the ACRC recovered a total of US$60.3 million, while whistleblowers received 
US$6.2 million in financial compensation (Wolfe et al., 2014). The rewards ranged from 4% 
to 20% of the recovered government revenues, with the upper limit increasing to 30% in 
October 2015 to reinforce the incentives for reporting wrongdoing (ACRC, 2016). During 
2002-2013, there were 181 requests for whistleblower protection and 36% of these were 
granted (Wolfe et al., 2014). 
Even though the government has attempted to shape a better legal environment for 
whistleblowers, and the law seems somewhat effective at protecting whistleblowers and 
exposing corruption, Korea still needs to address shortcomings in the law. According to a 
recent assessment of worldwide whistleblowing protection provisions, the Korean public 
sector whistleblower protection law presents unclear rules in three areas: circumstances 
where seeking external reporting channels are justified, internal disclosure procedures, and 
protections for anonymous reporting (Wolfe et al., 2014). In the Corruption Perceptions 
Index, Korea still had a low score of 53 in 2016, compared to 74 for the US, while the UK 
received a score of 81, and Sweden 88 (Transparency International, 2017). The number of 
public officials who breached the code of conduct has also risen from 1,089 in 2009 to 1,965 
in 2014 (ACRC, 2016). The available evidence thus suggests that there is a need to improve 
ethical standards, as well as the use of whistleblowing more specifically as an effective tool 
in the fight against corruption.  
 
Predictors of Public Sector Whistleblowing Intention in Korea 
As discussed above, changes to the legal environment since the enactment of the Anti-
Corruption Act in 2001 have established whistleblowing processes along with a system of 
rewards/ compensation and mechanisms for whistleblower protection in the Korean public 
sector. The breadth of these changes suggests that there is a need to examine the extent to 
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which attitude toward whistleblowing, knowledge of whistleblowing processes, perceived 
protection against retaliation, organizational support, and colleague support impact upon 
whistleblowing intention. The Act has been in operation for some time, and there has been 
increased publicity about protection for whistleblowers. We therefore expect that public 
officials will have knowledge of and a favorable attitude toward whistleblowing, along with a 
positive perception of support and protection available from their organization and 
colleagues. 
 
Attitude toward whistleblowing. Attitude toward a behavior means “the degree to 
which a person has a favorable or unfavorable evaluation or appraisal of the behavior in 
question” (Ajzen, 1991, p. 188). It is important to measure attitude toward whistleblowing as 
an independent variable, as a supportive attitude is not the same as whistleblowing intention 
and there is not always a strong link between the two, particularly if there are few resources 
and opportunities available and there are perceived negative social pressures (Ajzen, 1991). 
Still, generally, as a person’s attitude toward a behavior becomes more favorable, intention to 
perform the behavior becomes stronger. As such, a number of studies have analyzed attitude 
as a predictor of whistleblowing intention (Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009; Park et al., 2005; 
Richardson, Wang & Hall, 2012; Trongmateerut & Sweeney, 2012). More specifically, 
attitude has been found to have a positive effect on internal whistleblowing intention in Korea 
(Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009). We, therefore, hypothesize as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Positive attitude toward whistleblowing increases whistleblowing intention 
among public officials. 
 
Knowledge of whistleblowing process. As noted above, the Anti-Corruption Act 
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outlines the overall public sector whistleblowing process, including who can and who should 
blow the whistle, where they can report, and how to proceed. The law supports internal 
whistleblowing only; public officials should only report to the ACRC, investigative agencies, 
or the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea. If external reports are made (i.e., to the press 
or non-profit organizations), the whistleblower will not receive legal protection. Under the 
law, all informers should identify themselves to the agency where they file the report by 
submitting their personal information, including name and affiliation. Importantly, the law 
also outlines protection which is available against retaliation and how to obtain financial 
compensation.  
Knowledge of whistleblowing channels and processes might be an important predictor 
of whistleblowing intention. Even though the government has enacted a range of 
whistleblower protections, if people lack knowledge about appropriate channels and the 
whistleblowing procedure, they will be hesitant to come forward (Near & Miceli, 1985). 
Similarly, Cho and Song (2015) found whistleblowing training to have a positive effect on 
whistleblowing intention. Therefore, the current study hypothesizes that:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Greater knowledge about appropriate channels and procedures of 
whistleblowing increases whistleblowing intention among public officials. 
 
Colleague and organizational support for whistleblowing. Members of an 
organization can perceive organizational support by fair and transparent operation of dissent 
channels, whistleblowing education programs, and leaders, middle managers, or colleagues’ 
positive responses after previous whistleblowing incidents (Miceli, Near, Rehg & Van 
Scotter, 2012; Miceli, 1995; Sims & Keenan, 1998; Thoroughgood, Hunter & Sawyer, 2011). 
Research has found organizational climate to create perceptions and shape the behavior of 
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members in various work situations (Thoroughgood et al., 2011). More specifically, Mesmer-
Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) find that organizational climate for whistleblowing is 
related to both whistleblowing intention and actual whistleblowing. However, the social 
desirability of whistleblowing has been subject to debate. For example, Cruise (2002) sees 
whistleblowing as dysfunctional and points to the long-lasting nature of the detrimental 
effects for organizations. In the East-Asian context, employees have traditionally been 
reluctant to report wrongdoing due to the perception of whistleblowers as betrayers or 
informants (Park et al., 2005). In this regard, support from organizations and colleagues may 
reduce the potential psychological costs, and thereby have a positive influence on 
whistleblowing intention. We hypothesize as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Public officials are more likely to intend to blow the whistle when they perceive 
there to be sufficient organizational support.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Public officials are more likely to intend to blow the whistle when they perceive 
there to be sufficient colleague support.  
 
Perceived protection against retaliation. Many whistleblowers suffer from various 
forms of retaliation after their actions. Examples include social isolation, verbal and physical 
violence, close monitoring of work, demotion, no promotion, dismissal, counter accusations, 
and blacklisting (Cassematis & Wortley, 2013; Chang et al., 2013). Rothschild (2008) finds 
that fear of retaliation was the most important reason underlying the decision not to blow the 
whistle. Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) also suggest that fear of retaliation was 
negatively related to whistleblowing intention. This may be particularly important in the 
Korean context where the practice of whistleblowing has had terrible consequences for some 
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whistleblowers. In several case studies conducted by Chang et al. (2013), whistleblowers not 
only operated in an unsupportive environment, but were also identified and experienced 
retaliation including losing their jobs. As such, potential whistleblowers may face significant 
financial and psychological costs. The hostile responses are seemingly rooted in collectivism, 
which sees organizational goals as more important than individuals’ goals, and values 
“loyalty, harmony, cooperation, unity, conformity, and the unquestioning acceptance of 
norms, attitudes, and values in an organization” (Park et al., 2005, p. 391). It is not surprising 
if this environment seriously discourages potential whistleblowers despite improvements in 
the Korean whistleblower protection law. Therefore, this study hypothesizes that: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Perceptions that whistleblowers are strongly protected against possible 
retaliation are associated with increased whistleblowing intention among public employees. 
 
Control Variables 
While attitude toward and knowledge of whistleblowing are important, along with 
organizational support and protection, there is also a need to address personal variables, as 
some demographic groups may be more likely to blow the whistle than others. Researchers 
have found various demographic predictors to influence whistleblowing intention. More 
specifically, gender, age, income, education, and marital status have been shown to have a 
significant influence (Keil et al., 2010; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Miceli & 
Near, 1988, Sims & Keenan, 1998; Zhang et al., 2009). However, the results have often 
varied considerably. For example, on the one hand, studies by Keil et al. (2010) and Mesmer-
Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) suggest that women are more likely to blow the whistle than 
men. On the other hand, Miceli and Near (1988), Sims and Keenan (1999), and Bashir et al. 
(2011) claim that men are more likely to decide to blow the whistle than women. In a similar 
DETERMINANTS OF WHISTLEBLOWING INTENTION 14 
 
vein, age is a significant variable for Bashir et al. (2011), Keil et al. (2010), and Zhang et al. 
(2009), but Sims and Keenan (1999) find age to have little influence on whistleblowing 
decision. The present study includes gender, marital status, tenure, duty and position. We 
anticipate that gender may be of particular relevance. Even when occupying nominally the 
same roles, women are often treated differently than men (Franke, Crown & Spake, 1997), 
and may face harsher retaliation for whistleblowing (Rehg, Miceli, Near & Van Scotter, 
2008). Given Korean women’s disadvantage in the labor market (Cooke & Brown, 2015), 
they may be less willing to put their career at risk in order to report wrongdoing. 
 
Method 
Data  
The survey was designed and administered by the Audit and Inspection Research Institute to 
examine how changes to organizational environment influence organizational behavior, to 
learn about public officials’ conception of corruption, and to develop new monitoring and 
oversight policies. The survey was web-based, and ran from August 1–24, 2012. There have 
been no major whistleblowing cases up to the time of writing that could be seen to affect the 
relevance of the results. Park Geun-hye’s impeachment may eventually impact upon public 
officials’ views on corruption in Korea, but it is not yet clear what shape this might take and it 
will take time for the dust to settle. 
All public officials working in central government were sent an email inviting 
voluntary participation, and ensuring anonymity of identity and confidential treatment of 
survey data. This yielded a total of 5,706 responses, equivalent to 3.7% of the country’s 
approximately 154,000 central government employees (OECD, 2012b). It is important to note 
that the Audit and Inspection Research Institute has a central and privileged role in examining 
attitudes to whistleblowing among Korean public officials, but this of course does not mean 
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that it is neutral. Thus, the possibility that the nature of the Institute may have attracted some 
respondents but put off others cannot be ruled out, nor can the possibility that this might have 
influenced response bias in favor of whistleblowing.  
 
Measures  
The dependent variable is whistleblowing intention (WBI), as outlined in the statement “I 
intend to blow the whistle if I find corruption in my organization.”4 Respondents were asked 
to choose an option from four ordered responses (Strongly disagree; Disagree; Agree; 
Strongly agree). Using these ordinal responses means that we are not able to measure the 
distance between the responses (for example, the difference between strongly agree and 
agree). There is much debate about the benefits of a neutral response option (i.e., neither 
agree nor disagree), with some researchers recommending its inclusion in order to reduce 
response bias (Weijters, Cabooter & Schillewaert, 2010). However, by eliminating the mid-
point response, we attempted to stimulate respondents’ cognitive processes to decide on 
optimal answers (Krosnick, Narayan & Smith, 1996). A related issue is the number of 
response alternatives. While reliability and validity have been found to improve as the 
number of response alternatives increases, it has been suggested that the optimum number of 
options is between four and seven (Lozano, García-Cueto & Muñiz, 2008).  
The main explanatory variables were measured using single items as follows: attitude 
toward whistleblowing (“In general, I support public officials’ whistleblowing”); knowledge 
of whistleblowing (“I know appropriate procedures and have sufficient knowledge about 
whistleblowing”); perceived protection against retaliation (“I think public officials are 
properly protected from possible retaliation when they become whistleblowers”); 
                                                          
4 Based upon the Anti-Corruption Act, public officials should only report corruption which violates the law to 
the ACRC, investigative agencies, or the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea. Thus, responses were not 
concerned with other forms of wrongdoing (which violate social norms but not the law for example), nor 
reporting to supervisors, press, or the public. 
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organizational support (“My organization supports whistleblowing”); and colleague support 
(“My colleagues support whistleblowing”). While there are occasions where multiple item 
measures are desirable, the aim was to provide a concise web-based survey by shortening the 
number of questions and thus, boosting response rates, which are relatively low in online 
surveys (Christophersen & Konradt, 2011). 
Demographic characteristics were captured by five variables. Gender (1: female, 0: 
otherwise) and marital status (1: married, 0: otherwise) were entered dichotomously. Tenure 
was measured in years, then entered in eight categories (1-5 years, 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, 21-25, 
26-30, 31-35, 36 or above). Additional controls include duty and position held by public 
employee. Duty was entered using eight categories (Regulation, general service, tax, 
procurement and property management, planning/budgeting & research, human resource 
management, evaluation and audit, other). Finally, position was entered using six categories 
(Regular government service, special service, positions by political appointees, skilled & 
technical service, temporary contract, other).  
 
Sample 
The Audit and Inspection Research Institute did not target public officials with specific 
characteristics, which means that the sample is more representative of some groups than 
others. As can be seen in Table 1, there were more male (76.6%) than female respondents 
(23.4%). In the population of central government public officials, the respective percentages 
were 68.9% and 31.1% (MOPAS, 2012). When it comes to length of service, there was a 
relatively even spread, with the most frequent responses being 16-20 years of service 
(20.7%), 21-25 years of service (18.8%), and 6-10 years of service (17.7%). The great 
majority of respondents (84.3%) were married, which reflects national trends (Frejka, Jones 
& Sardon, 2010). A wide range of job duties were found among respondents, with the most 
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frequent responses being general service (30.1%), followed by planning, budgeting, and 
research (15.4%). The survey was broadly representative in terms of position type, with the 
exception of special service employees, who at 12.0% were overrepresented (1.0% in the 
population), and skilled and technical service employees, who at 7.1% were underrepresented 
(24.9% in the population) (MOPAS, 2012). 
 
Analytical Strategy 
The analysis involved three steps. The first involved using factor association to explore the 
association of each factor with WBI in order to generate descriptive statistics to better 
understand the sample characteristics (the relationships between the predictors on the one 
hand and WBI on the other). In the second step, ordered probit models were fitted to predict 
public officials’ WBI. Ordered probit analysis was used as the dependent variable takes the 
form of an ordered category, and it allows us to measure the WBI of respondents with 
particular characteristics (attitude, knowledge, colleague support, etc.). 
 
The model is shown below:  
 
WBIi = β1*ATTITUDE+ β2*KNOWLEDGE+ β3*ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT + β4* 
COLLEAGUE SUPPORT + β5*PROTECTION + β6*FEMALE+ β7*MARRIED+ 
β8*TENURE+ β9* DUTY+ β10* POSITION+ εi 
 
where ε is normally distributed (Liao, 1994). 
 
The dependent ordered variable WBIi of an observation i takes the values of 1, 2, 3 and 4 in 
accordance with the k cut-off points (threshold parameters) as follows: 
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WBIi=1 if  WBIi≤ 𝑘1 
WBIi=2 if  𝑘1 <WBIi ≤ 𝑘2 
WBIi=3 if  𝑘2 <WBIi ≤ 𝑘3 
WBIi=4 if  𝑘3 <WBIi 
 
In the third step, average marginal effects in the ordered probit model were investigated. This 
strategy allowed the examination of the discrete change in predicted probability of each level 
of WBI for each of the values of the predictors. In particular, outcomes of high levels of WBI 
were focused on (WBI=3 and WBI=4). For marginal effects estimation, average marginal 
effects (AMEs) were used. While marginal effects at the means (MEM) are widely used 
(Williams, 2012), MEM has the limitation that it uses some values that a real person could 
not have, such as being 23.4% female or 84.3% married. In contrast, AME involves 
computing the marginal effects for every case in the sample, rather than simply using the 
means. 
Results 
Factor Association with Whistleblowing Intention 
Factor association with WBI is summarized in Table 1. Among the total 5,706 respondents, 
76.9% chose the two high categories of WBI (WBI=1=strongly disagree, 2.4%, 
WBI=2=disagree, 20.7%, WBI=3=agree, 57.8% and WBI=4=strongly agree, 19.1%). As far 
as main factors are concerned, answer option 3 (i.e., agree) was the most frequent choice 
among the total sample, accounting for an approximate range of 54-59% of responses for all 
but one of the variables. Perceived protection against retaliation was the exception as option 2 
outnumbered option 3 (41.4% compared to 34.7%). This can be interpreted as meaning that 
the majority of respondents had high perceived levels of attitude, knowledge, colleague and 
organizational support for whistleblowing, but did not feel that adequate levels of protection 
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against retaliation were in place. It can also be seen that the main factors have positive 
relationships with the higher WBI responses; with each additional level of attitude, 
knowledge, colleague and organizational support, and perceived protection against 
retaliation, the proportion choosing response 3 (WBI=3) increased dramatically. The largest 
rise was seen in colleague support, which jumped from 15.7% to 80.1% for WBI=3 (from 
colleague support=1 to colleague support=3), followed by organizational support, which 
increased from 23.5% to 79.4% (from organizational support=1 to organizational support=3). 
This suggests that colleague and organizational support play an important role in influencing 
the level of WBI. A similar relationship was also observed for response 4; the highest degrees 
(i.e., 4 out of 4) of attitude, knowledge, colleague and organizational support, and protection 
against retaliation were associated with the greatest shares of the strongly positive WBI, 
ranging from 61.4% (knowledge=4) to 83.2% (protection against retaliation=4).  
In terms of control variables, male respondents showed higher rates (by 2% for 
WBI=3 and 10.5% for WBI=4 respectively), indicating stronger WBI by male compared to 
female public employees. Being married seemed to have a negligible difference in the two 
highest WBI categories, as differences of less than 3% were observed. Factor association also 
tells us little about the remaining control variables. When it comes to tenure, for example, 
officials with 36 years or more experience were the most likely to select WBI=3, while those 
with 31-35 years’ experience were least likely (a difference of 15.5%). However, for WBI=4, 
this situation was reversed; officials with 31-35 years’ experience were 12% more likely to 
select the highest category of WBI when compared to colleagues with 36 years or more 
experience. In order to investigate the relationships in more depth, we conducted an ordered 
probit regression analysis.  
Table 1 to Feature Here 
Ordered Probit Models 
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The results of the probit models are displayed in table 2 in hierarchical order. Each additional 
predictor in the subsequent models improved model fit. For instance, model 6 shows a better 
fit than model 5 [𝜒2(21 df) = 66, p<0.01]. The statistically significant threshold parameters 
(cutoff 1, cutoff 2 and cutoff 3, all p<0.01) in each model indicate that the four response 
categories are different from each other, establishing the need to proceed to ordered probit 
modeling. The final model explains approximately 30% of the variation in WBI. The largest 
proportion of variation was attributable to attitude followed by colleague support (R2=0.139 
and ΔR2=0.078, respectively). Organizational support and knowledge also made up 
approximately 10-13% of the total variation in WBI (see recalculated R2 in Table 2), while 
perceived level of protection and demographic variables hardly contributed to the variance. 
Table 2 to Feature Here 
 
In order to focus on the relationship with high levels of WBI, the next step was to examine 
the marginal effects. As displayed in Table 3, attitude, knowledge, colleague support, 
organizational support, and protection against retaliation have strong positive effects on the 
choice of the highest category, WBI=4 (β=0.228, 0.276, 0.698, 0.504, 0.197, all p<0.01). 
Females showed a lower propensity to choose the strongest WBI response than males. 
Service of five years or more also had a negative effect on choosing WBI=4. However, tenure 
of 20 years or more was not statistically significant at 5%, suggesting that respondents with 
tenure length of over 20 years are similar to those with a short tenure of 1-5 years when it 
comes to choosing WBI=4. In contrast, positions generally had a positive relationship with 
WBI=4, although not all positions were statistically significant. Marital status and job duty 
were not found to be good predictors (p>0.05). 
While ordered probit estimates reveal the average effect of each predictor, average 
marginal effects show a discrete change in the expected probability of choosing response 
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category 4 (WBI=4). The largest changes were for colleague support and organizational 
support; a one-point increase in colleague support and organizational support raises the 
probability of choosing WBI=4 by approximately 12.5% and 9% respectively. Other main 
factors had relatively less influence on choosing the highest category. Each additional level of 
attitude and knowledge is associated with 4.1% and 4.9% increased likelihood of choosing 
WBI=4. For each higher level of perceived protection, individuals were 3.3% less likely to 
select WBI=2 and 3.5% more likely to report WBI=4. Female public officials, however, are 
negatively associated with WBI=4; they were 3.4% less likely to report WBI=4 than men. 
Those with 6-20 years of service were also 2-3% less inclined to choose WBI=4 than those 
whose tenure was 1-5 years. In terms of position, political appointees were 8.1% more likely 
to select the highest category of WBI, followed by skilled and technical services (4.1%) and 
special services (2.3%), when compared to the regular government service position.  
 
Table 3 to Feature Here 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The results reveal several important findings. First of all, the descriptive statistics suggest that 
public officials in Korean central government have a positive attitude toward whistleblowing, 
and consider themselves to have sufficient knowledge of whistleblowing procedures and 
appropriate support for whistleblowing from both colleagues and organizations. The positive 
relationship of attitude, knowledge, colleague support, organizational support, and protection 
against retaliation with WBI confirms hypotheses 1-5.  
The analysis of marginal effects, while supporting the role of attitude and knowledge, 
sheds light on the importance of colleague and organizational support. Indeed, colleague and 
organizational support were the first and second strongest predictors of WBI=4 respectively. 
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WBI increased with higher reported levels of colleague and organizational support, which 
emphasizes the importance of government responsibility in encouraging and supporting 
whistleblowing. This responsibility goes beyond a rule based approach to the creation of a 
supportive atmosphere. Perceived protection against retaliation, with the least influence 
among the main variables, plays less of a role than in previous studies (Rothschild, 2008). 
This is particularly interesting given the Korean context and history of severe consequences 
(Lee, J.M., 2003; Lee, J.Y., 2003).  
When taken together with the findings for organizational and colleague support, it 
may be that the benefits of formal protection are perceived to be limited if faced with 
potentially hostile responses from colleagues and the wider organization. Even when 
whistleblowers have not been dismissed, forced to resign, or blacklisted, they have faced 
difficulties such as being excluded from organizational opinion channels, having work 
withheld, and being isolated from their colleagues (Chang et al., 2013; Jeon, 2003). 
Consequently, most whistleblowers have felt isolated and faced emotional and physical health 
problems.  
Turning to the control variables, female public officials reported lower WBI. There 
has been considerable debate in the literature about who is more likely to whistleblow: 
women (Keil et al., 2010; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005) or men (Bashir et al., 
2011; Miceli & Near, 1988; Sims & Keenan, 1999). The results in the present study may be 
understood by women’s relative lack of power in the Korean workplace where they feel more 
vulnerable in terms of employment security and are more likely to want to avoid controversy 
and unnecessary attention. The other main group with low WBI were those with between six 
and 20 years of service. Strong public sector job security and a desire among public 
employees to maintain this appears to hinder whistleblowing activities in Korea, particularly 
for employees who may feel locked in to a particular career path and still have a considerable 
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number of years before retirement.  
Political appointees, special service, and skilled and technical service employees all 
reported higher levels of WBI than those in regular government service. In the case of 
political appointees, this may be influenced by their relatively powerful positions within the 
government hierarchy, where their skills are in demand. However, all of these employee types 
are more likely to work alone or in small teams, meaning that they may be less concerned 
about potentially negative responses from colleagues. 
The lack of longitudinal data and studies with similar questions on whistleblowing in 
Korea means that it is difficult to make comparisons. However, a greater proportion of 
respondents both indicated their intention to whistleblow and saw whistleblowing outside the 
organization as desirable than in Lee’s (1999) study of Seoul City government. Although 
caution is needed in the absence of a directly comparable study, the findings do support 
research which has found attitude and knowledge of whistleblowing processes to have 
positive effects on WBI (Cho & Song, 2015; Near & Miceli, 1985; Park & Blenkinsopp, 
2009). Rather than seeing whistleblowing as having negative effects (Cruise, 2002), public 
officials have shown their intention to come forward, but organizational and colleague 
support is clearly influential. This highlights the continued importance of collectivism, 
through loyalty and seeking a harmonious working climate. More practically, it points to the 
limits of legislation and toward the need for initiatives which can help create a supportive 
organizational culture. 
It is important to note that the present study has some limitations. First, due to using 
data collected for government purposes, we were unable to include a wider range of variables 
relating to WBI. For example, questions about the perceived seriousness of the wrongdoing, 
types of wrongdoing, and status of wrongdoers may have helped to paint a more nuanced 
picture, as would distinguishing between awareness of protection and awareness of 
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colleagues who actually received protection. In addition, as responses are based upon 
employee perceptions, they do not offer objective indicators of support, protection, and 
knowledge. Still, the data does offer a valuable insight into employee perceptions, and there 
are significant correlations with WBI.  
As the Audit and Inspection Research Institute did not target particular characteristics 
among public officials, it could be suggested that those who associate greater risks with 
whistleblowing were less likely to respond. A recommendation for future research is to target 
particular respondent characteristics, for example through stratified sampling. More 
generally, future studies could conduct qualitative interviews with whistleblowers in order to 
investigate actual whistleblowing, rather than intent. 
 
Implications and Recommendations 
On the one hand, the results suggest that the Anti-Corruption Act and ACRC policy 
implementation have been somewhat effective in publicizing the importance of 
whistleblowing and raising knowledge of the available mechanisms. On the other hand, 
researchers have criticized ACRC’s limited independence and investigative power, the 
narrow range of protections offered, poor enforcement of ACRC decisions, and the limited 
number of formal whistleblowing channels (Lee, J.Y., 2003; Park, 2008). This was confirmed 
in the data as the majority of responses for protection against retaliation were in the lower 
half of the scale. This can be understood in the context of insufficient protection stemming 
from unclear rules in external, internal and anonymous reporting (Wolfe et al., 2014). The 
lower levels of perceived protection may indicate that Korean public employees are not sure 
about what protection is available against internal disclosure procedures. Also, protections for 
anonymous reporting by public officials are not in place in Korea. This calls for a stronger 
role from the Korean government in establishing clear rules about appropriate reporting 
DETERMINANTS OF WHISTLEBLOWING INTENTION 25 
 
channels in favor of protecting whistleblowers against retaliation before promoting the 
improved rules to government employees. 
The findings represent a challenge to the Korean government’s efforts to encourage 
employees to report corruption. There have been great improvements in the legal protection 
available. While essential, this is only part of the story and is unlikely to succeed without the 
support of colleagues and the wider organization. Moreover, discrimination against women 
and employee insecurity relating to fear of losing their livelihood in a competitive labor 
market are not issues which can be addressed overnight, particularly in light of women’s 
position in Korea’s polarized labor market (Choi & Park, 2014; Cooke & Brown, 2015).  
However, there is more that the Korean government can do to create a supportive 
environment in which employees feel comfortable blowing the whistle. As such, this study 
recommends that the Korean government should focus its efforts on training and promotional 
materials, which use empathy toolkits and outline the importance of supporting colleagues 
who report corruption. These efforts would need to be informed by awareness of the role of 
gender, tenure length, and position type in relation to WBI, in order to help shape an 
environment where all employees benefit from colleague and organizational support and do 
not feel that their employment would be jeopardized by whistleblowing. Engaging more 
employees in this way would help to improve WBI, and also have the broader positive effects 
of increasing transparency, fairness, and ultimately, increasing trust (Shim & Park, 2016); 
goals which are shared by whistleblowers. 
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Table 1. Factor Association with Whistleblowing Intention (WBI)       
  Total sample  WBI=3 WBI=4 
   N   (%)   N  %  N  % 
Total sample      5,706        3,300  57.8%      1,089  19.1% 
Main factors 
Attitude       
Scale 1 (lowest)        167  (2.9%)1          40  24.0%2          18  10.8%2 
Scale 2      1,217  (21.3%)         574  47.2%          66  5.4% 
Scale 3      3,123  (54.7%)      2,362  75.6%         223  7.1% 
Scale 4 (highest)      1,199  (21.0%)         324  27.0%         782  65.2% 
Knowledge       
Scale 1        185  (3.2%)          67  36.2%          32  17.3% 
Scale 2      1,248  (21.9%)         620  49.7%          94  7.5% 
Scale 3      3,172  (55.6%)      2,267  71.5%         287  9.0% 
Scale 4      1,101  (19.3%)         346  31.4%         676  61.4% 
Colleague support       
Scale 1        115  (2.0%)          18  15.7%            8  7.0% 
Scale 2        934  (16.4%)         295  31.6%          30  3.2% 
Scale 3      3,372  (59.1%)      2,701  80.1%         169  5.0% 
Scale 4      1,285  (22.5%)         286  22.3%         882  68.6% 
Organizational support       
Scale 1        183  (3.2%)          43  23.5%          24  13.1% 
Scale 2      1,333  (23.4%)         531  39.8%          72  5.4% 
Scale 3      3,249  (56.9%)      2,580  79.4%         239  7.4% 
Scale 4        941  (16.5%)         146  15.5%         754  80.1% 
Perceived protection against retaliation      
Scale 1        795  (13.9%)         309  38.9%         146  18.4% 
Scale 2      2,362  (41.4%)      1,409  59.7%         223  9.4% 
Scale 3      1,982  (34.7%)      1,505  75.9%         248  12.5% 
Scale 4        567  (9.9%)          77  13.6%         472  83.2% 
Controls 
Gender       
Male      4,372  (76.6%)      2,549  58.3%         942  21.5% 
Female      1,334  (23.4%)         751  56.3%         147  11.0% 
Marital status       
Not married        895  (15.7%)         524  58.5%         145  16.2% 
Married      4,811  (84.3%)      2,776  57.7%         944  19.6% 
Tenure       
1-5 years        911  (16.0%)         574  63.0%         135  14.8% 
6-10      1,009  (17.7%)         593  58.8%         171  16.9% 
11-15        539  (9.4%)         322  59.7%         104  19.3% 
16-20      1,182  (20.7%)         646  54.7%         235  19.9% 
21-25      1,075  (18.8%)         612  56.9%         223  20.7% 
26-30        542  (9.5%)         311  57.4%         122  22.5% 
31-35        381  (6.7%)         197  51.7%          91  23.9% 
36 or above          67  (1.2%)          45  67.2%            8  11.9% 
Duty       
Regulation        734  (12.9%)         402  54.8%         147  20.0% 
General      1,718  (30.1%)      1,020  59.4%         307  17.9% 
Tax        129  (2.3%)          71  55.0%          26  20.2% 
Procurement/property        250  (4.4%)         159  63.6%          29  11.6% 
Planning/budgeting/research        877  (15.4%)         520  59.3%         146  16.6% 
HR        612  (10.7%)         347  56.7%         115  18.8% 
Evaluation        552  (9.7%)         302  54.7%         166  30.1% 
Other        834  (14.6%)         479  57.4%         153  18.3% 
Position       
Regular government service      4,327  (75.8%)      2,749  63.5%         803  18.6% 
Special service        683  (12.0%)         408  59.7%         152  22.3% 
Political appointees          46  (0.8%)          23  50.0%          13  28.3% 
Skilled & Technical services        406  (7.1%)         234  57.6%          81  20.0% 
Temporary contract          85  (1.5%)          54  63.5%          14  16.5% 
Other        159  (2.8%)         102  64.2%          26  16.4% 
Notes: 1. The percentages, 2.9%, 21.3%, 54.7% and 21.0% are the share of each scale from 1 to 4 out of the total 5,706 
responses. 2. The proportion, 24% is calculated by 40 divided by 167 (i.e., the share of participants who chose WBI=3 
along with Scale 1 of the attitude variable).  
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Table 2. Ordered Probit Models    
 1 2 3 4 5 63 
Attitude 0.889** 0.754** 0.313** 0.239** 0.230** 0.228** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Knowledge  0.489** 0.452** 0.336** 0.276** 0.276** 
  (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) 
Colleague support   0.915** 0.683** 0.704** 0.698** 
   (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Organizational support    0.579** 0.498** 0.504** 
    (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) 
Perceived protection against retaliation   0.199** 0.197** 
     (0.023) (0.023) 
       
Cutoff 1 0.296** 1.230** 2.342** 2.627** 2.699** 2.602** 
 (0.068) (0.082) (0.093) (0.096) (0.098) (0.118) 
Cutoff 2 1.736** 2.714** 3.989** 4.358** 4.450** 4.368** 
 (0.065) (0.081) (0.095) (0.099) (0.100) (0.119) 
Cutoff 3 3.652** 4.731** 6.200** 6.646** 6.751** 6.688** 
  (0.074) (0.092) (0.109) (0.114) (0.116) (0.133) 
-2 loglikelihood 10305 9846 8913 8540 8467 8401 
McFadden's R2 0.139 0.177 0.255 0.286 0.293 0.298 
ΔR2   0.0381 0.078 0.031 0.007 0.005 
Recalculated R2  47%2 13% 26% 10% 2% 2% 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01.       
Notes: 1. ΔR2 is calculated by R2model+1−R2 model. 2. Recalculated R2 is the proportion of ΔR2 divided by the overall R2 of 0.298 in Model 
6. 3. The coefficients of female, married, tenure, duty and position variables in Model 6 are shown in Table 3, below. 4. Standard errors 
are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 3. Ordered Probit Overall Estimates and Marginal Effects           
 
Overall 
Average Marginal Effects 
  WBI=1 WBI=2 WBI=3 WBI=4 
   Main factors       
Attitude 0.228** (0.029) -0.009** (0.001) -0.038** (0.005) 0.007** (0.001) 0.041** (0.005) 
Knowledge 0.276** (0.027) -0.011** (0.001) -0.047** (0.005) 0.009** (0.001) 0.049** (0.005) 
Colleague support 0.698** (0.033) -0.029** (0.002) -0.118** (0.006) 0.022** (0.003) 0.125** (0.006) 
Organizational support 0.504** (0.032) -0.021** (0.002) -0.085** (0.005) 0.016** (0.002) 0.090** (0.006) 
Protection 0.197** (0.023) -0.008** (0.001) -0.033** (0.004) 0.006** (0.001) 0.035** (0.004) 
   Controls        
Female -0.188** (0.040) 0.008** (0.002) 0.032** (0.007) -0.006** (0.001) -0.034** (0.007) 
Married 0.001  (0.052) -0.00004  (0.002) -0.0002  (0.009) 0.00003  (0.002) 0.0002  (0.009) 
Tenure 
6-10 -0.127* (0.059) 0.005* (0.002) 0.021* (0.010) -0.002  (0.001) -0.023* (0.011) 
11-15 -0.163* (0.072) 0.006* (0.003) 0.027* (0.012) -0.004  (0.002) -0.030* (0.013) 
16-20 -0.167** (0.061) 0.007** (0.002) 0.028* (0.010) -0.004* (0.002) -0.030** (0.011) 
21-25 -0.098  (0.063) 0.004  (0.002) 0.016  (0.010) -0.002  (0.001) -0.018  (0.012) 
26-30 -0.143  (0.074) 0.006  (0.003) 0.024  (0.012) -0.003  (0.002) -0.026* (0.013) 
31-35 -0.150  (0.082) 0.006  (0.003) 0.025  (0.014) -0.003  (0.003) -0.027  (0.015) 
36 or above -0.186  (0.156) 0.007  (0.007) 0.031  (0.027) -0.005  (0.007) -0.034  (0.027) 
Duty           
General 0.079  (0.054) -0.003  (0.002) -0.013  (0.009) 0.003  (0.002) 0.014  (0.010) 
Tax 0.052  (0.117) -0.002  (0.005) -0.009  (0.020) 0.002  (0.004) 0.009  (0.021) 
Procurement/property -0.022  (0.089) 0.001  (0.004) 0.004  (0.015) -0.001  (0.004) -0.004  (0.015) 
Planning/budgeting/research 0.035  (0.062) -0.001  (0.003) -0.006  (0.011) 0.001  (0.002) 0.006  (0.011) 
HR 0.022  (0.067) -0.001  (0.003) -0.004  (0.012) 0.001  (0.003) 0.004  (0.012) 
Evaluation 0.130  (0.071) -0.005  (0.003) -0.022  (0.012) 0.004  (0.002) 0.023  (0.013) 
Other 0.054  (0.063) -0.002  (0.003) -0.009  (0.011) 0.002  (0.002) 0.010  (0.011) 
Position 
Special service 0.127* (0.053) -0.005* (0.002) -0.021* (0.009) 0.003** (0.001) 0.023* (0.010) 
Political appointees 0.410* (0.181) -0.014** (0.005) -0.064* (0.025) -0.003  (0.010) 0.081* (0.040) 
Skilled & Technical services 0.221** (0.065) -0.008** (0.002) -0.036** (0.010) 0.003** (0.001) 0.041** (0.013) 
Temporary contract 0.133  (0.136) -0.005  (0.005) -0.022  (0.022) 0.003* (0.001) 0.024  (0.026) 
Other 0.128  (0.100) -0.005  (0.004) -0.021  (0.016) 0.003* (0.001) 0.023  (0.019) 
           
*p<0.05, **p<0.01                     
Notes: 1. Reference category: Male, not married, 1-5 years (tenure), regulation (duty), regular government service (position). 2. Standard errors 
are shown in parentheses. 
 
